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The sense of agency in autism
spectrum disorders: a dissociation
between prospective and
retrospective mechanisms?
Tiziana Zalla* and Marco Sperduti
Department of Cognitive Studies, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Institut Jean Nicod, Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique, Paris Sciences et Lettres Research University, Paris, France
While a large number of studies have reported impairments in social and interpersonal
abilities in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), relatively few studies have
focused on self-related knowledge in this population. One of the processes implicated
in the physical dimension of the Self is the sense of agency (SoA), i.e., the experience
of initiating and controlling one’s own actions and producing desired changes in the
world via these actions. So far, the few studies investigating SoA in ASD have reported
contrasting results, with some showing spared, others impaired SoA. Here, we review the
existing literature and suggest that the distinction between prospective and retrospective
mechanisms of the SoA might help reconcile the existing findings. In the light of a multi-
componential model of SoA, we propose the view that a specific impairment at the level
of prospective mechanisms acting on internal agency signals (i.e., the intention, action
selection, or command produced to achieve the goal) may be responsible for the reduced
SoA in ASD, along with spared retrospective mechanisms. Future research should shed
light on the impact of abnormal SoA on social and self-related dysfunctions in ASD.
Keywords: action monitoring, comparator model, intentional binding, intrapersonal cognition, metacognition,
agency
Introduction
Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are characterized by social and communicative impairments,
restricted interests, and repetitive behaviors (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). More
recently, research has provided circumstantial evidence suggesting that some forms of intrapersonal
cognition might be altered in people with ASD (Uddin, 2011), and that diminished self-
related knowledge might be crucially linked to early childhood social impairments in this
population (Lombardo et al., 2010). However, while abundant research has investigated social
and communication impairments in individuals with ASD, intrapersonal and self-representation
processes have received little attention.
One fundamental distinction posited by theoretical models of self-representation is that between
implicit and explicit processes (Klein and Gangi, 2010). The former mainly involve body-grounded
mechanisms, such as proprioceptive and sensorimotor processes, whereas the latter typically
implicate abstract self-knowledge and autobiographical memory (e.g., Conway, 2005). Within the
Self-Memory System, impaired episodic memory along with spared semantic autobiographical
memory and self-trait knowledge have been reported in ASD (Lind, 2010), and Lombardo et al.
(2010) have shown atypical processing of abstract self-knowledge in individuals with ASD. In line
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 12781
Zalla and Sperduti Agency in autism
with these findings, it has been proposed that declarative processes
related to the Self are impaired (Lind, 2010; Uddin, 2011), while
physical and embodied aspects of the Self, such as the sense
of agency (SoA), are relatively preserved in this population
(David et al., 2008a; Williams and Happé, 2009). However,
previous evidence on SoA in individuals with ASD using different
experimental paradigms has brought mixed results, with studies
showing either preserved (David et al., 2008a; Williams and
Happé, 2009) or impaired SoA (Grynszpan et al., 2012; Sperduti
et al., 2014; Zalla et al., 2015).
Theoretical proposals have been advanced to explain the SoA
in normal and pathological conditions, with some accounts
emphasizing prospective mechanisms occurring prior to action
execution (e.g., Chambon et al., 2014), and others assigning a
preponderant role to retrospective mechanisms occurring after
action execution (e.g., Wegner et al., 2004). These two types of
account are not necessarily contradictory, but while prospective
and retrospective processes can be distinguished in experimental
settings, they are usually integrated in more ecological and
everyday life conditions. Recently, Moore and Fletcher (2012)
suggest that internal (motoric) and external (reafferent sensory
information) signals, that in our framework roughly correspond
to prospective and retrospective mechanisms respectively, are
weighted, depending on their availability and their reliability, to
produce a coherent SoA.
To clarify this controversial issue, we propose here that
a distinction needs to be made between different types
of component processes contributing to the SoA, and that
apparently contradictory results can be conciliated by postulating
a dissociation between impaired prospective and spared
retrospective processes of the SoA in ASD. Given the lack of
a general consensus on the mechanisms which are specifically
involved in the genesis of SoA, we will here use the term
prospective to refer to those processes occurring before overt
action execution and we will use the term retrospective to
denote those processes occurring after action execution. The
latter includes comparator mechanisms, as well as higher-level
inferences based on motor performance (e.g., judgment of
performance) or contextual information.
In the following, wewill first present an overview of the existing
models of the SoAbased on empirical studies in typical population
and individuals with ASD, and then review their implication for
our theoretical proposal.
Sense of Agency: A Multi-Componential
Account
The SoA is the experience of initiating and controlling one’s
own action and hence producing desired changes in the world
through these actions (Haggard and Tsakiris, 2009). As such, it
is a fundamental ability grounding all kinds of efficient self-world
interactions, from instrumental actions to social exchanges. The
SoA refers to a complex cognitive phenomenon; in everyday life,
it is experienced as a “diffuse sense of a coherent, harmonious
on-going flow of action processing” (Synofzik et al., 2008, p. 228).
The predominant theory explaining the SoA is based on
the Central Monitoring mechanism and, in particular, the
ComparatorModel (Wolpert et al., 1995; Frith et al., 2000). Initially
developed to account for sensory-motor control (e.g.,Wolpert and
Miall, 1996), the Comparator Model was subsequently extended
to a model of the SoA (Frith et al., 2000). It states that the
sensory consequences of one’s behavior can be predicted based
on internal action-related information, such as the efferent copy
of a central motor command (Bell, 2001). While the efferent
copy is used by the forward model to predict the state of the
system, the afferent sensory inputs are used to estimate the actual
state. If predicted and estimated actual states are congruent, the
actions are experienced as self-performed whereas, in case of
a mismatch, incongruent signals indicate either an erroneous
prediction or an external source as the cause of that action.
Hence, the matching process between central motor commands
and feedback signals arising during action execution is the crucial
mechanism underlying the SoA. Importantly, this implies that
the emergence of a SoA can be inferred retrospectively after
action execution, that is only after reafferent sensory signals are
processed and compared with the “internal prediction.” In this
view, the SoA is regarded as a retrospective inference concerning
the action-effect causal structure.
A more radical retrospective account of SoA posits that the
actual execution of voluntary action is not even necessary to
experience agency, but that the co-occurrence of outcomes that
are coherent with the agent’s prior intentions would be sufficient
for the emergence of this experience (see Wegner et al., 2004).
While this account assigns to the comparator mechanisms a
central role in generating SoA retrospectively, alternative theories
provide support for the view that prospective mechanisms also
play a pivotal role in the emergence of a SoA, and crucially
contribute to the generation of the subjective feeling of control
over the action outcome (Moore and Haggard, 2008; Chambon
et al., 2014).
However, a consensual view on the nature and the role of the
prospective processes involved in generating SoA is still lacking.
People use a variety of cues to assign agency, but how this
information dynamically interacts to form the unitary feeling of
consciously willing the action is still a matter of debate. In a
recent review, Hughes et al. (2013) have suggested that predictions
can be made about the motor identity of the stimulus, based on
the performed action (motor identity prediction), or about the
timing of a sensory stimulus (temporal prediction). While neither
process seems necessary to produce SoA, the mere presence of an
action can drive this phenomenon, suggesting the involvement of
the motor system. Nevertheless, as the authors also underlined,
existing studies do not include the appropriate experimental
conditions to effectively evaluate the differential impact of various
predictive signals. Moreover, other processes occurring before
action execution and that are unrelated to predictive mechanisms,
such as action selection, may contribute to SoA (e.g., Chambon
et al., 2014).Hence, the broader category of prospectiveprocesses is
used to denote all mechanisms occurring before action execution,
whereas retrospectivemechanisms refer to all processes occurring
after action execution.
To clarify the contribution of prospective and retrospective
processes to action awareness and to the SoA,Moore andHaggard
(2008) employed an experimental paradigm based on intentional
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binding (IB), an implicit measure of the SoA (Haggard et al.,
2002). IB consists in the temporal attraction between a voluntary
operant action and its effect (e.g., a tone). In this experiment,
participants were instructed to press a key at a time of their
own choosing which caused an effect (e.g., a tone) 250 ms later.
In one condition, 75% of the actions were followed by a tone;
in the other condition, only 50% of the actions caused a tone.
The authors found that when the action-effect contingency was
highly predictable (as in the 75% probability condition), IB was
present even in the absence of the outcome, when no matching
process was possible, suggesting that in this condition prospective
cues drive SoA. Conversely, when the probability was low (as
in the 50% probability condition), the IB only occurs when the
outcome was actually present. These findings suggested that both
prospective and retrospective mechanisms contribute to SoA.
More recently, Moore and Fletcher (2012) have proposed
that SoA results from the integration of multiple available cues
within a Bayesian model that combines prior knowledge or
expectations operating as prospective cues with sensory data
acting as retrospective cues. The action-effect relation can be
considered as prior knowledge, built up by inferring the causal
structure from patterns of statistical correlation over the course of
the block, whereas the various sources of information including
efferent and somatosensory information, as well as the auditory
information about the tone following the action are regarded
as sensory data. On this view, the SoA involves the integration
not only of multiple signals from a single event, but also the
integration of predictions, built up over the course of previous
actions, with information from sensory events on the current trial
(Moore and Fletcher, 2012). Thus, prospective and retrospective
information are weighted, depending on their availability and
their reliability, to produce a coherent SoA.
It is important to note that previous reports on normal
and pathological conditions have usually employed experimental
paradigms tapping the ability to recognize actions as being self-
generated or generated by external agents, in which prospective
and retrospective signals contributing to the SoA were conflated
or not adequately dissociated (David et al., 2008b). Action
recognition studies in patients with parietal lobe lesions have
shown that failure to detect the mismatch between sensorimotor
afferent information and visual feedback about self-performed
movements is not sufficient to generate abnormal SoA (Sirigu
et al., 1999), and research on amputees has revealed that, in
the absence of reliable proprioceptive or sensorimotor cues,
other sources of information contribute to SoA (Ramachandran
and Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996). Importantly, prospective and
retrospective processes can be selectively impaired, as already
shown in patients with schizophrenia (Voss et al., 2010).
The Sense of Agency in ASD
The “Comparator Model” posits that action monitoring is a
central mechanism for the emergence of SoA. Within this
framework, impairment at the level of action monitoring is often
taken as indirect evidence of SoA disruption. Pioneer studies
by Russell and Jarrold (1998, 1999) suggested that an impaired
mechanism relating motor commands to their visual outcomes
might underlie diminished action monitoring and SoA in ASD.
The authors employed a task in which children with and without
autism had to choose, by pressing a left or right key, which of two
characters would serve a ball to hit a target that appeared either
to the left or to the right (Russell and Jarrold, 1998). In half of
the trials, the task generated a stimulus-response incompatibility
provoking errors, and subjects had the possibility to correct
their error pressing the opposite button. The results showed that
children with ASD made more errors and corrected a lower
proportion of wrong answers, suggesting an action monitoring
impairment. In a subsequent study, Russell and Jarrold (1999)
reported that children with ASD had difficulties in correctly
deciding whether an action had been produced by themselves or
by another agent. In line with these findings, lack of self-reference
(Toichi et al., 2002) and reduced memory enhancement for self-
performed, as compared to others’ (visually encoded) actions,
have been reported in adults with high functioning ASD (Zalla
et al., 2010; Daprati et al., 2013). Various interpretations have
been offered for this failure, including an impaired mechanism
relating actionmotor commands to their visual outcomes (Russell
and Jarrold, 1999; Zalla et al., 2010), a strong dependence on the
increased executive demands produced by the task (Hala et al.,
2005) or a delayed development of source monitoring abilities,
which would be strictly dependent on verbal mental age (Farrant
et al., 1999).
However, subsequent studies failed to replicate these findings.
For example, Hill and Russell (2002) did not observe difficulties
in self-other attribution of previously executed actions in children
with ASD. Russell and Hill (2001) showed that children with
ASD were as able as the control group in discriminating their
own actions from those of an external agent by judging on-line
which one of several colored dots presented on a computer screen
was under their intentional control (through movements of the
mouse). Similarly,Williams andHappé (2009) found that children
withASDhad no difficultiesmonitoring their own actions/agency
using an on-line action monitoring task requiring individuals
to distinguish person-caused from computer-caused changes in
visually presented squares. A study by David et al. (2008a) directly
investigated the SoA in adults with ASD using a target completion
task. Participants had to move a cursor on a computer screen,
controlled by a joystick, toward one of two targets and could
track the trajectory of their movements on the screen. At the
end of each trial they were asked to judge whether the visual
feedback matched the performed movement and whether this
was self-generated or not. The task manipulated the degree of
correspondence between the participants’ movements and the
corresponding visual feedback. Unbeknownst to the participants,
in 50% of the trials, they received a false visual feedback for
the path of the cursor. The authors reported that participants
with and without ASD did not differ in their accuracy in
judging self-other agency, and concluded that agency and action
monitoring were preserved in ASD. Indeed, these findings seem
to indicate that motor identity prediction, and the comparison
with reafferent visual signals are spared in ASD. In addition,
it is important to note that, in this experiment, the action was
followed by the actual feedback in 50% of the trials, making the
actual movements not reliably predictive of the visual feedback.
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The participants were explicitly asked to report whether the
visual feedback matched their movement, making it possible
that the assignment of agency in participants with ASD would
rely retrospectively on the comparator mechanism. Alternatively,
since in the actual feedback conditions reaching the target might
be easier, as compared to the distorted feedback conditions, the
assignment of agency could also be inferred retrospectively on
the basis of external cues, such as the subjective goodness of
performance.
In accordance with this interpretation, Zalla et al.’s (2015)
findings support the hypothesis of intact retrospective
mechanisms for the SoA in ASD. In this study, participants
were asked to perform a computer-based task in which they
had to touch Xs and avoid touching Os streaming down the
screen by moving a box on a gray track via the computer
mouse. The paradigm allowed investigating the influence of the
objective manipulation of control on the judgment of agency in
individuals with ASD. In addition to the condition in which the
box displacements were totally under the participants’ control,
there was an experimental condition in which participants’
control of the cursor was altered by the introduction of a time
lag between mouse and cursor movement, or by the addition of
turbulence (random noise) to the cursor position. At the end
of each trial, participants judged their own control over the
game (i.e., made a judgment of agency) and how successful they
were at touching the Xs and not touching the Os (i.e., made a
judgment of performance). The results revealed a decrement in
the actual motor control, together with a good accuracy level in
their metacognitive judgment of performance (i.e., the perceived
goodness of performance) and judgment of agency. However,
while all participants grounded their judgment of agency on
judgment of performance, participants with ASD showed reduced
sensitivity to and diminished use of the internal sensorimotor
cues generated during the experimental manipulations. These
diagnostic cues are responsible for forming an internal prediction
model (i.e., the efferent copy) of self-performed action, likely
affecting both action monitoring and SoA in ASD.
These findings have two important implications. First, subtle
impairments in SoA and an altered sense of control might
be observed in participants with ASD when the SoA is not
operationalized as an all-or-nothing process (presence or absence
of SoA), but rather as a continuum of a variable subjective
strength of control. Second, in line with our proposal, the SoA
in ASD relies mostly on a preserved metacognitive judgment of
agency, based on retrospective signals, while it might be affected
by a reduced reliance on predictive sensorimotor cues or by
atypical forms of intermodal weighting of action signals. Hence,
when asked to evaluate their action performance and control,
individuals with ASD would tend to rely more on retrospective
processes (judgments of performance), than on actual control. In
making their judgments of agency, they used external cues, such
as goodness of performance, but they relied to a lesser extent than
did control participants on the particular internal sensory motor
cues that are diagnostic of agency.
Recently, we have investigated SoA in a group of adults
with ASD using the IB paradigm (Sperduti et al., 2014). In
our task, the action effect contingency was highly reliable
(the action was always followed by the same stimulus  100%
contingencies). Importantly, under this condition, when the
action-effect association is reliable, predictive cues have been
shown to drive IB and SoA (Moore and Haggard, 2008). The
main results showing that IB was reduced—but not completely
abolished—in adults with ASD are in line with the hypothesis
of altered prospective mechanisms in this population. Further
studies are needed to directly test this hypothesis, since our
experimental manipulation did not permit a straightforward
distinction between prospective and retrospective processes.
In line with our interpretation, “Bayesian cue integration
models” of agency posit that the SoA relies on the weighted
integration of multiple internal and external agency cues together
with prior beliefs. Recently, it has been suggested that both
social and non-social impairments in ASD could be accounted
for by an abnormal weighting of prior expectations and sensory
information, possibly resulting from abnormally high sensory
precision and enhanced bottom-up functioning (Pellicano and
Burr, 2012; Lawson et al., 2014). Specifically, the attenuation
of Bayesian priors—“hypo-priors”—may be responsible for the
atypical sensory experience and perception of the world, which
would be more perceptually accurate and less modulated by
prior experience in individuals with ASD. It is thus likely that
such abnormal interplay between bottom-up sensory signals
and top-down predictions, based on abstract prior knowledge
and background information, might also explain the atypical or
reduced SoA in this population.
In a recent study, Chambon and Haggard (2012) showed
that SoA in typical populations might also be informed by
early signals generated at the moment of action selection. In
these circumstances, the source of the prospective information is
the action selection mechanism, which operates prior to action
performance and to action–outcome matching. Following the
authors’ proposal, the signals relating to the fluency of action
selection (on the so-called “Inverse model”) are temporally stored
in an Intentional Buffer and prospectively generate the SoA during
the process of action planning. Action fluency signals arising from
action selection processes may operate, at an implicit level, to
produce a feeling of control, and be buffered until sensorimotor
feedbacks ensuring the matching process are available. At the
conscious level, this prospective experience of agency might
constitute the basis for the process of self-attribution of intention.
An abnormal sense of action control and SoA in people with ASD
might indeed reflect limited accessibility to prospective internal
agency cues based on action fluency selection, at the level of action
planning.
Converging evidence suggests that participants with ASD have
difficulties introspecting their own motor intentions (Phillips
et al., 1998; Williams and Happé, 2010), and that the earlier
stages of action planning and movement preparation might be
impaired (Rinehart et al., 2001, 2006; Dowd et al., 2012; Daprati
et al., 2013). As previously reported (Williams and Happé, 2010),
children with ASD were less able to recognize their own knee-
jerk reflex movements as unintentional, or their own mistaken
actions as unintended, than age- and ability-matched comparison
participants, which suggests a diminished awareness of their
own intentional states. It is worth noting that, in Russell and
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Jarrold’s (1998) aforementioned study, children with ASD were
slower in giving correct answers, but they were as fast as the
control group when they succeeded in correcting their errors.
While these results were taken as reflecting an action-monitoring
impairment associated with a disrupted CM mechanism, an
alternative interpretation is that slower reaction times in choosing
the correct answer might indeed reflect difficulties in action
selection or action fluency. In assigning agency, individuals
with ASD would fail to adequately combine prospective cues,
based on action selection or action fluency, with retrospective
proprioceptive or visual feedbacks.
Taken together, these findings support the view that multiple
prospective and retrospective cues contribute to the creation of
a reliable SoA, with little explicit knowledge available to the
agent concerning how this integration process is computed by
the brain. Importantly, the absence of or the limited sensitivity
to early prospective agency cues associated with voluntary action
(i.e., fluency of action selection, or command produced to
achieve the goal) could determine an abnormal SoA and an
impairment in the self-attribution of intentions. While in normal
conditions, both external and internal sources of information
are used to determine the SoA, in individuals with ASD the
influence of retrospective cues may increase when the reliability
or accessibility of internal agency signals decreases. Even if
speculative, this hypothesis can be tested by employing paradigms
that allow distinguishing the specific contribution of prospective
and retrospective mechanisms to the SoA. One example is
the manipulation employed in the aforementioned study by
Moore and Haggard (2008) which provided convincing evidence
of a similar dissociation in schizophrenia. Other possibilities
are offered by neuroimaging techniques (fMRI, EEG). Indeed,
if prospective mechanisms were selectively impaired in ASD,
we would expect to find functional abnormalities in regions
underpinning action planning and SoA, such as the angular
gyrus, the premotor and supplementary motor areas (Chambon
et al., 2013; Moore et al., 2010; Sperduti et al., 2011), before
action execution. Figure 1 schematically represents the putative
mechanisms involved in SoA, and the different stages at which the
impairment might occur in ASD.
SoA as a Precursor of Social Impairment in
ASD?
In accordance with the theoretical accounts of the SoA which
distinguishes prospective and retrospective agency cues (e.g.,
Chambon et al., 2014), we have reviewed convergent evidence
supporting the notion that ASD is characterized by impaired
prospective and spared retrospective processes underlying the
SoA. Specifically, we have argued that the distinction between
the different sources of information generating the SoA allows
explaining divergent results on the SoA in ASD. Previous studies
reporting spared SoA in ASD employed tasks that tapped
more on retrospective cues (e.g., David et al., 2008a), or on
retrospective metacognitive judgments of agency (e.g., Zalla et al.,
2015), whereas diminished SoA can be observed when the task
maximized reliance on prospective mechanisms (Sperduti et al.,
2014). Hence, we have suggested that the impairment might be
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of mechanisms involved in SoA.
Impairment of SoA could emerge at the level of (1) action selection; (2)
predictive processes implemented by the forward model; (3) comparator
mechanisms, and (4) inferential processes based on actual motor
performances (e.g., judgment of performance) or contextual cues. Red circle
(1) represents likely impaired mechanisms leading to altered SoA in ASD; gray
circle (2) represents processes for which there is mixed evidence, green
circles (3, 4) represent likely spared processes in ASD.
characterized by reduced reliance on some critical prospective
agency signals generated at the earlier stage of action selection and
planning, as explained by the Inverse Model. While prospective
and retrospective signals are normally combined to generate the
SoA, less reliance on internal prospective signals in ASDmight, in
turn, be responsible for an atypical form of intermodal weighting
of agentic action signals, resulting in a diminished SoA, and
likely in impairment in self-attribution of intentions. Although
an extensive literature has largely documented disturbances of
mindreading or Theory ofMind (ToM), i.e., the ability to attribute
beliefs and other mental states to oneself and to others in
individuals with high functioning ASD (Bowler, 1992; Happé,
1994; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Zalla et al., 2009), fewer studies
have investigated the relationship between mindreading and
intrapersonal cognition, such as SoA, and in this population.
Interestingly, in Zalla et al. (2015), reduced sensitivity to
endogenous sensorimotor activity correlated with difficulties in
an advancedToM task in participants withASD, suggesting a close
link in development between SoA and mindreading.
Previous studies investigating SoA using social scenarios
have shown that when two typically developed individuals are
engaged in bringing about a common outcome, a “we” identity
is automatically and pre-reflectively formed, and both partners
register agency at the pre-reflective level (Obhi and Hall, 2011).
Pfister et al. (2014) further extended these results by showing
that when the action of one participant (the leader) produces a
stimulus that serves as an imperative signal for the action of a
second participant (the follower), the leader implicitly experiences
SoA not only for her action’s effect, but also for the follower’s
action. These findings suggest that we not only feel control over
changes that we produce in the physical world, but that our agency
experience might extend to the changes produced in other agents’
behavior in a social context.
Taken together, these results highlight the role of low level
predictive mechanisms as building blocks for higher level
cognitive functions, and open up new paths for the understanding
of the relationship between abnormal SoA and social impairments
in ASD.
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